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Non-Technical Summary
The objective of IFRS financial statements is to provide useful information to decision
makers. Accounting information about the company’s tax burden is distorted by differences
in the asset or liability tax base and its carrying amount in the balance sheet. Therefore,
IAS 12 (Income Taxes) requires a company to recognise a deferred tax liability or a deferred
tax asset. IAS 12 does neither permit nor require future tax payments to be discounted.
On the other side, tax planning should focus on the net present value of the company’s tax
payments. Although timing effects of taxation are suppressed by reported tax expenses,
it is common practice to use accounting information as a performance measure for the
company’s tax management.
A simple investment model of a multinational company shows that IAS 12 does not consider
the effects of different depreciation rules on the net present value of an investment. Hence,
it is very likely that the information about the tax consequences of investment decisions
and international investment shifting is misleading. However, IAS 12 provides meaningful
information if the company’s tax planning is driven by the statutory tax rate as in the
case of international profit shifting. Consequently, the information content of income tax
accounting in accordance with IAS 12 depends on the relevance of the respective type of
tax planning in which the company engages.
Using a panel of firm-level balance sheet data of German outbound FDI, provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank, we investigate empirically companies’ tax planning patterns. We
find empirical evidence that German multinationals engage in tax rate driven international
profit shifting via debt financing and intra-firm sales. Thus, we conclude that insofar IAS 12
discloses the relevant information about the company’s tax burden. However, we also find
empirical evidence that tax depreciation impacts on the size of investments. Consequently,
we cannot rule out the possibility that IAS 12 does not fully disclose the company’s tax
burden. Since the information content of IAS 12 income tax accounting depends on the
relevance of the respective type of tax planning, both shareholders and the company’s tax
management should use accounting information provided by IAS 12 with caution. Reported
effective tax rates might be seriously misleading, when the company’s tax planning strategy
focuses on real investments.
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1 Introduction
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require a company to account for
current and future tax consequences, due to transactions and other events recognised in
profit or loss (IAS 12). Reported tax expense (tax income) seems to be relevant for both
company tax management (Bolton, Chastel and Young, 2004) and shareholder investment
decisions (Swenson, 1999, Scholes et al., 2005, 44-45). IAS 12 does not require future
taxes to be discounted. In contrast, effective tax planning exploits timing effects and
thus operates with discounted tax payments. Moreover, investment decisions are based
on discounted cash flows after taxes. This leads to the conclusion that IAS 12 income
tax reporting fails to provide full disclosure of the company’s tax burden (Guenther and
Sansing, 2000, Halperin and Sansing, 2006, Becker, Fuest and Spengel, 2006). Why, then,
should both tax management and shareholders use reported tax expenses to assess the tax
burden of the company?
There is empirical evidence for both the decision usefulness (Beaver and Dukes, 1972,
Chaney and Jeter, 1994) and the value relevance of income tax reporting (Givoly and Hayn,
1992, Amir, Kirschleitner and Willard, 1997). Compared to a capital market approach
(Barth, Beaver and Landsmann, 2001), we do not test if income tax accounting amounts
have a significant relation with share prices. Our focus is on the company’s tax planning
patterns in order to assess the information content of IAS 12 income tax reporting. Since
IAS income tax reporting fails to disclose timing effects, the quality of information about
a company’s tax planning performance provided by IAS 12 depends on the dominant tax
driver. Therefore, it is analysed whether tax planning is driven by the tax base which gives
rise to timing effects or by the statutory tax rates.
Financial statements according to IFRS are mostly prepared by multinationals. These
companies are able to engage in international tax planning by either shifting profits or
real investments to low tax countries. Investment decisions are sensitive to statutory
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tax rates as well as to tax bases (e.g. tax depreciation rules) and, hence, timing effects
of taxes matter (Devereux and Griffith, 1998). In contrast, profit shifting is driven by
differences in statutory tax rates only. Consequently, IAS 12 income tax reporting is not
severely distorted by timing effects of taxes, if profit shifting is the company’s dominant
tax planning tool. In this case, IAS 12 provides clear-cut information about the effective
tax burden to both tax management and shareholders. Given this observations, the issues
to be addressed in this paper are: Is there empirical evidence for profit shifting by means
of inter-company finance and inter-company sales, and if so, do we also find evidence for
investment shifting?
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we develop a simple model
of international tax planning. In section 3 and 4 we present the data used and the empirical
investigation approach. In section 5 we then discuss our empirical findings, while section
6 concludes.
2 A Model of International Tax Planning
2.1 International Tax Planning and Investment Shifting
We employ a cash flow model in the tradition of King (1977) and King and Fullerton (1984),
in order to analyse an investment at location i in t = 0 of the amount ki and the resulting
cash flow [fi(ki) + kiν] · (1 − ν)t−1 for 0 < t ≤ ∞. ν denotes the economic depreciation
rate and fi(ki) the pre-tax return on capital ki. It is assumed that the rate of return
fi(ki)
ki
does not vary over time. Thus, the cash-flow [fi(ki) + kiν] decreases annually by a factor
of (1 − ν). Tax depreciation of investment in time t > 1 amounts to ki · [αi · (1 − αi)t−1],
where αi denotes the tax depreciation rate.
We consider the case of a multinational consisting of a parent and a subsidiary. The parent
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is located in country 1 and the subsidiary is located in country 2. The net present value
(NPV) of multinational investment in both locations can be defined as
NPV =
(1− τ1)[f1(k1) + k1ν]
ρ+ ν
+
τ1α1k1
ρ+ α1
+
(1− τ2)[f2(k2) + k2ν]
ρ+ ν
+
τ2α2k2
ρ+ α2
. (1)
The investor’s discount rate is denoted by ρ. τi denotes the statutory tax rate at location i.
The first and third part of (1) reflect the net present value of after-tax earnings generated
in both locations. The second and fourth part of (1) represent the present value of tax
savings due to the depreciation of the invested capital in both locations. Given the pre-tax
cash flow, an investment’s net present value depends on the relationship between the rate
of economic depreciation and the rates of tax depreciation as well as on statutory tax rates.
We find the optimum investment level at location 2 which the company chooses by differ-
entiating equation (1) with respect to its capital invested in location 2:
∂NPV
∂k2
= (1− τ2) [f2,k(k2) + ν]
ρ+ ν
+
τ2α2
ρ+ α2
≡ 0. (2)
The optimum investment level depends on the statutory tax rate as well as the tax depre-
ciation rate. The effects of a higher tax rate and a higher tax depreciation rate on the net
present value are shown by the following simple comparative static properties. Assuming
neoclassical properties, fi,k(ki) > 0, fi,kk(ki) < 0, where the rate of return decreases with
increasing investment levels in t = 0, and by using equation (2), we obtain the marginal
effects in regard to investment by the tax rate as well as the tax depreciation rate:
dk2
dτ2
=
1
f2,kk(k2)(1− τ2) [f2,k(k2) + ν − α2
ρ+ ν
ρ+ α2
] ≷ 0, (3)
dk2
dα2
= − 1
f2,kk(k2)(1− τ2) ·
τ2(ρ+ ν)ρ
(ρ+ α2)2
> 0. (4)
A higher statutory tax rate depresses investment, if the tax depreciation rate does not
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largely exceed the economic depreciation rate. However, a higher tax depreciation rate
constitutes an investment incentive. Given a higher tax depreciation rate in location 2
than in location 1 (α2 > α1), the parent may prefer to shift investments to location 2. The
investment incentive of the tax depreciation rate increases with a higher statutory tax rate.
Let us now compare these cash-flow based tax incentives with informations provided by
financial accounting. IAS 12.86 defines tax expenses for financial accounting purposes as
the sum of both current and deferred taxes. A deferred tax liability (tax asset) shall be
recognised for taxable (deductible) temporary differences (IAS 12.15, IAS 12.24). Deferred
tax liabilities arise if the carrying amount of an asset exceeds the asset’s tax base. When
the company recovers the carrying amount, it realises a taxable profit (the difference be-
tween the carrying amount and the asset’s tax base) and pays corporate income taxes.
Therefore, the company recognises a deferred tax liability, which represents future income
tax payments. According to IAS 12.85, the company shall use a tax rate that provides the
most meaningful information to users of financial statements. For a company operating in
several countries, IAS 12.85 recommends the use of the domestic tax rate in each individual
country.
According to the IFRS Framework, accrual accounting provides the type of information
“...that is most useful to users in making economic decisions”(Framework, 22). Conse-
quently, shareholders should be able to assess the value of the company’s investments,
when after-tax profits serve as a proxy for the company’s net cash-flow. In the context
of the model, the deferred taxes in time t > 1 are defined as the difference of accounting
depreciation (which equals the economic depreciation) and tax depreciation in a location
multiplied by the respective statutory tax rate: τi · [ν · (1− ν)t−1 − αi · (1− αi)t−1]. After
inserting this into equation (1) the investment’s net present value adjusted for deferred
taxes (NPVD) equals
4
NPV D =
(1− τ1)[f1(k1) + k1ν]
ρ+ ν
+
τ1α1k1
ρ+ α1
− τ1α1k1
ρ+ α1
+
τ1k1ν
ρ+ ν
(5)
+
(1− τ2)[f2(k2) + k2ν]
ρ+ ν
+
τ2α2k2
ρ+ α2
− τ2α2k2
ρ+ α2
+
τ2k2ν
ρ+ ν
=
(1− τ1)f1(k1) + k1ν
ρ+ ν
+
(1− τ2)f2(k2) + k2ν
ρ+ ν
.
The information provided by financial accounting suggests that the tax expenses are deter-
mined in each period only by statutory tax rates in both locations. Timing effects resulting
from tax depreciation rules vanish.
Since the profit-based net present value NPVD of equation (5) does not assess the true
value of the company’s investment, tax expenses reported by financial accounting do not
correctly indicate the impact of taxes on investment decisions. Differentiating equation (5)
with respect to the capital invested in location 2 leads to
∂NPV D
∂k2
= (1− τ2)f2,k(k2) + ν ≡ 0. (6)
The investment decision seems to only be affected by the statutory tax rate in location
2. However, discounting the accounting profit after taxes plus depreciation leads to the
correct value of the company’s investments (NPV=NPVD), only if the net present value
of tax depreciation equals the net present value of economic depreciation (ν = αi). In this
case, the first order conditions (2) and (6) are equal. Thus, the tax information provided by
IAS 12 implies that tax depreciation rules are neutral with respect to investment decisions.
Since IAS 12 eliminates relevant information concerning timing differences between the
locations’ tax depreciation rules, reported tax expenses are misleading as a performance
measure of tax planning. From an analytical point of view, neither company’s tax manage-
ment nor shareholders investment decisions should be based on accrual accounting infor-
mation. However from an empirical point of view, it is unclear to what extent international
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investment decisions are driven by tax depreciation incentives. Hence, the tax information
provided by financial accounts might not be completely misleading.
2.2 International Tax Planning and Profit Shifting
Profit shifting is possible by means of intrafirm financing decisions or intrafirm transfer
pricing. Therefore, tax savings resulting from profit shifting are a function of the share of
intrafirm debt, µi, and of the volume of intrafirm trading, ωi. Subsidiaries are subject to
corporate income tax in the country of their legal domicile. Under an exemption system,
as it is in force in Germany and in most other European countries,1 repatriated profits
are not taxed.2 Hence, the term Si(µi, ωi) · (τi − τj) denotes tax savings arising from the
shifting of the profit amount Si(µi, ωi) from location i to location j. The function ci(µi, ωi)
represents non-tax costs of profit shifting; ci(µi, ωi) is a convex function, i.e. ci,µ(µi, ωi) > 0,
ci,µµ(µi, ωi) > 0 as well as ci,ω(µi, ωi) > 0 and ci,ωω(µi, ωi) > 0. In context of the model
developed in section 2.1, we can write the net present value of investments at two locations
in presence of profit shifting. When considering the opportunity to shift profits between
jurisdictions, we obtain the investments’ cash flow-based net present value
NPV =
(1−τ1)[f1(k1)+k1ν]
ρ+ν
+
τ1α1k1
ρ+α1
+
S1(µ1, ω1)(τ1−τ2)−c1(µ1, ω1)(1−τ1)
ρ+ν
(7)
+
(1−τ2)[f2(k2)+k2ν]
ρ+ν
+
τ2α2k2
ρ+α2
+
S2(µ2, ω2)(τ2−τ1)−c2(µ2, ω2)(1−τ2)
ρ+ν
.
Again, introducing deferred taxes eliminates the timing effects of tax depreciation, as it is
demonstrated in section 2.1. In this case we obtain the profit-based net present value,
1We neglect the taxes levied on a small part of repatriated profits. Germany taxes 5% of the respective
profits.
2Note that even in countries employing a credit system, such as in Great Britain or in the US, companies
seem to avoid repatriation taxes (Altshuler and Grubert, 2003).
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NPV D =
(1− τ1)f1(k1) + k1ν
ρ+ ν
+
S1(µ1, ω1)(τ1 − τ2)− c1(µ1, ω1)(1− τ1)
ρ+ ν
(8)
+
(1− τ2)f2(k2) + k2ν
ρ+ ν
+
S2(µ2, ω2)(τ2 − τ1)− c2(µ2, ω2)(1− τ2)
ρ+ ν
.
Using equation (7) and (8), respectively, and considering the optimal profit shifting vol-
umes, tax planning incentives can be described. Let us, for example, focus on subsidiary
2. For the optimum of profit-shifting activities, we obtain the first-order conditions
∂NPV
∂µ2
=
∂NPV D
∂µ2
= S2,µ(µ2, ω2)(τ2 − τ1)− c2,µ(µ2, ω2)(1− τ2) ≡ 0, (9)
∂NPV
∂ω2
=
∂NPV D
∂ω2
= S2,ω(µ2, ω2)(τ2 − τ1)− c2,ω(µ2, ω2)(1− τ2) ≡ 0. (10)
The first-order conditions are only influenced by statutory tax rates. Both first-order
conditions on the basis of after-tax cash flows and based on after-tax profits are the same.
Therefore, it is evident that the profit shifting effect on tax payments is outlined by reported
tax expenses within the company’s financial accounting.
The tax incentive to use intrafirm trading as well as internal debt becomes clearer, when
comparative static properties are employed. It is a reasonable assumption that the marginal
effect of intrafirm trading or internal debt is constant with increasing intrafirm trading
or internal debt, i.e. S2,µµ(µ2, ω2) = 0 and S2,ωω(µ2, ω2) = 0. Moreover, we assume
that µ and ω can be used independently, i.e. the cross derivatives c2,µω(µ2, ω2) = 0 and
S2,µω(µ2, ω2) = 0. Then, using equations (9) and (10), respectively, we obtain for the
comparative static effects
dµ2
dτ2
=
S2,µ(µ2, ω2) + c2,µ(µ2, ω2)
(1− τ2)c2,µµ(µ2, ω2) > 0, (11)
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dω2
dτ2
=
S2,ω(µ2, ω2) + c2,ω(µ2, ω2)
(1− τ2)c2,ωω(µ2, ω2) > 0. (12)
The size of internal debt as well as of intrafirm trading is positively affected by an in-
creasing local tax rate: A rising local tax rate generates increasing incentives to create tax
deductions, in the respective location, by means of interest payments for intrafirm debt or
by means of higher payments for intrafirm trading.
Since this type of tax planning is well documented by reported tax expenses, according to
IAS 12, the information provided by financial accounting is useful to assess a multinational
company’s tax planning performance by means of profit shifting. The more a multinational
company engages in profit shifting and the higher its profits are, the more the statutory
tax rate dominates the company’s tax planning activities and the less important is the net
present value of tax depreciation savings for investment decisions. Thus, the reported tax
expenses of a multinational company may not be seriously misleading.
From an analytical point of view, it is unclear if profit shifting dominates investment shift-
ing. As it is demonstrated in section 2.1, high statutory tax rates may deter investments
from a location, even if the locations’ tax depreciation rate exceeds the economic depre-
ciation rate. However, if profits can be shifted away from the high tax location, the tax
depreciation rate becomes more relevant for real investment decisions. We may then find
investments in high tax locations that provide favourable tax depreciation rules, whereas
a significant part of investment profits are taxed in low tax locations. However, consider-
ing anti-avoidance tax legislation and non-tax constraints of profit shifting, it is unclear
whether and to what extent profit shifting works effectively in practice. Therefore, the
following empirical analysis on tax planning behaviour of German multinationals is carried
out to provide insights into the practical relevance of both investment shifting and profit
shifting as tax planning tools. Note that we do not focus on the relationship between
reported income taxes and share prices but on the companies’ tax planning behaviour.
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3 Investigation Approach
The practical relevance of different tax planning tools presented above is empirically anal-
ysed using data at the affiliate’s level. For the empirical analysis the Micro-database Direct
investment, MiDi, provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, is used.3 This database contains
financial statements of German outbound and inbound FDI as well as some additional
information on the parent company.
With regard to tax planning by means of profit shifting between jurisdictions, the compara-
tive static analysis provides testable relationships between company taxation and intrafirm
trading as well as intrafirm financing. The first implication, testing the existence of tax
planning via finance, can be concluded from equation (11), which suggests a positive effect
of a higher tax rate, at the affiliate’s location, on using company-internal debt. A simple
estimation equation for the share of intrafirm leverage ICL in country i taken by company
k in period t could be
ICLk,i,t = a0 + a1τi + a2ln(LendingRatei,t) + ak + at + k,i,t, (13)
where at denotes a time effect and ak a company fixed effect.
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With regard to profit shifting by pricing of intrafirm sales, equation (12) suggests that
intrafirm sales decreases with an increasing local tax rate. The MiDi data-set used for the
empirical analysis does not contain direct information on intrafirm sales of German FDI.
However, the balance sheet item ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies ’ can be used
instead. This item, denoted by AR, constitutes a snapshot of the annual intrafirm sales,
i.e. the unpaid share of intrafirm sales at the balance sheet date. The relationship between
intrafirm sales and its unpaid share at the balance sheet date, the ‘accounts receivable from
3See Lipponer (2006) for a detailed description of the data set.
4See Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) as well as Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber and Wamser (2006) for a
detailed description of empirical approaches to test tax incentives on financial structure choices.
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affiliates’, depends on local costs of refinancing outstanding bills as well as on firm specifics,
like a specific cash management system. A country specific lending rate constitutes a good
proxy for local refinancing costs, whereas company specifics are controlled by a company
effect bk. However, it should be mentioned that the payment date of accounts receivable
is irrelevant for tax purposes, as profits or losses are entered at the delivery date and not
at the payment date.
Then, the following estimation equation can be used,
ln(ARk,i,l,t) = b0 + b1τi,t + b2xi,t + b3ln(LendingRatei,t) (14)
+ bk + bt + bl + k,i,l,t,
where bk denotes a firm effect, bl an industry effect and bt a time specific effect.
5 Intrafirm
sales also depend on economic factors, as sales are based on delivered goods and services.
Therefore, company and industry effects are considered to control for unobservable hetero-
geneity between different company groups and industries. Moreover, the vector xi contains
a set of control variables.
Finally, we consider tax planning with regard to real investment decisions. As it is demon-
strated in section 2.1, reported tax expenses can be misleading if a company’s tax planning
activities are focused on timing effects of taxation, due to various tax depreciation rules.
Therefore, the main point of interest is whether tax incentives, due to different tax depre-
ciation allowances, have an impact on tax planning activities.
With regard to tax effects on real investment decisions within existing company structures,
the following estimation equation is used. This approach, which is similar to Buettner and
Wamser (2006), is likely to test the tax response of the investment level at each affiliate of
5Similar investigation approaches, which are focused on intrafirm sales, are used by Grubert (2003) as
well as Clausing (2006).
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the firm k,
ln(FixedAssetsk,i,t) = c0 + c1τi,t + c2(PV Di,t × τi,t) + c3zi,t + ck + ct + k,i,t, (15)
where the present value of depreciation at location i is denoted by PV Di, while zi denotes
a vector of control variables.
4 Data
TheMiDi database provides information on the investment object’s unconsolidated balance
sheet including further information on the type of investment and on the investor. This
analysis is based on data of German outbound FDI positions. A favourable characteristic
of the data set is the possibility to trace direct investment positions of individual firms
over time. The version used provides firm-level panel data for the period of 1996 to 2003.
The collection of the data is enforced by German law, which requires reporting obligations
for certain international transactions and positions.6 With regard to outbound FDI, each
German enterprise has to report its holdings of foreign assets. The database comprises
direct FDI and indirect FDI positions, if holdings are above some threshold level.7 However,
for the foreign object a time-constant threshold level of a balance sheet total above 3 million
euro is applied. Therefore any problems which may arise from different threshold levels
are avoided.
As financial statements based on IFRS must be prepared by public companies, only balance
sheet data of German parent companies are considered, which are in the legal form of
a public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft). As full consolidation is only applied if
affiliates are controlled, only observations are kept that display a participation level of
6Sec. 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations).
7For details about the threshold levels see Lipponer (2006).
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the German parent company of more than 50%. Furthermore, only firm observations are
included which display positive real capital and turnover for every reported year. All
companies in the sample, which actually produce at home and abroad, are considered, i.e.
holdings and financial service providers are excluded. As the model deals with a simple
two-tier company structure, indirectly held investments are excluded. Table 1 presents the
spatial apportionment of the considered German controlled affiliates from 1996 until 2003.
Table 1: Considered balance sheet accounts of German FDI 1996 -2003
Destination Country Subsidiaries Assets (e 1000) Share Sales (e 1000)
per subsidiary Assets per subsidiary
Australia 367 6,708 .014 38,017
Austria 657 16,137 .059 77,438
Belgium 473 17,461 .046 95,116
Canada 215 21,563 .026 84,698
Czech Republic 578 32,811 .105 88,154
Denmark 219 12,018 .015 53,881
Finland 96 6,597 .003 38,594
France 1,178 8,572 .056 89,688
Great Britain 852 6,992 .033 91,162
Greece 154 5,132 .004 35,234
Hungary 351 24,515 .048 94,006
Ireland 79 15,147 .007 40,620
Italy 1,004 8,590 .048 50,866
Japan 373 16,866 .035 122,400
Luxembourg 15 6,108 .001 66,400
Netherlands 572 7,748 .024 45,479
Norway 121 7,260 .005 42,463
Poland 571 10,361 .033 52,149
Portugal 122 10,345 .007 42,287
Slovakia 78 41,996 .018 55,795
Spain 679 10,890 .041 54,239
Sweden 296 11,702 .019 43,017
Switzerland 676 6,263 .023 63,916
USA 960 62,934 .334 170,433
Total 10,686 16,948 1.0 78,980
According to equations (13) and (14) financial ratios as well as the natural log of ‘accounts
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receivable from affiliated companies’ are taken from the MiDi database as dependent vari-
ables. Additionally, for estimating (15) the natural log of reported fixed assets is used as
the dependent variable. Moreover, the natural log of total sales of each firm is also taken
from the MiDi database.
Statutory tax rates are captured by the variable STR. In case of pure profit shifting by
means of finance or transfer pricing, the statutory tax rate represents tax savings due to
one unit shifted profit.8 The tax rate does not indicate tax savings by profit shifting if an
affiliate exhibits a loss carry forward or a current loss for tax purposes. For this reason
the dummy variable DLCF is used as an indicator for the possibility to offset former losses
with actual profits taking on the value one, while otherwise zero. As unpaid dividends and
interest of financial assets may cause higher accounts receivable, a dummy variable DFIN
is used, which represents financial interests in affiliated companies having the value one,
while otherwise zero. Furthermore, an indicator for the present value of depreciation for
tax purposes (PVD) of machinery is taken into account along with statutory tax rates.
This PVD indicator is calculated according to the European Commission (2001) using a
nominal interest rate of 7.1 per cent.
Additionally, country specific control variables are used. First, as the data does not con-
tain any information about firm-specific interest expenses, country specific lending rates
for credits to the private sector are taken, which are provided by the IMF International Fi-
nancial Yearbook and augmented by data provided by the European Central Bank. These
are used as a proxy of refinancing costs. Furthermore, nominal GDP is taken from the
OECD. In addition, flight distance between the affiliate location and Germany, as well as
hourly workers compensation, are used. Finally, a corruption perception index is taken
from Transparency International as corruption may deter FDI (e.g. Wei, 2002).
8For analysing the tax incentive on capital structure, the statutory tax rate is modified by applicable
restrictions on interest deductions. For instance, in Italy interest expenses are not deductible from local
business tax (IRAP).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Firm level variables
AR a) intra-company accounts 7,946 55,886 1 3,369,289
receivable in e thousand
DFIN a) binary .321 .467 0 1
DLCF binary .308 .462 0 1
Equity share of equity .389 .239 .001 .999
Fixed Assets fixed assets stock in e thousand 16,948 188,831 1 14,400,000
Sales sales in e thousand 78,980 591,588 1,000 51,900,000
ICL share of intra-company leverage .290 .245 .001 .998
Tax variables
PVD pres. val. of depreciation allow. .773 .105 .332 .914
PVD x STR .272 .066 .077 .428
STR statutory profit tax rate .351 .069 .100 .532
Further characteristics
Corruption Corruption Perception Index 6.96 1.71 3.42 10
Distance flight distance in km 2,168 3,508 190 16,470
GDP in billion US dollars 1,547 2,561 18.9 10,600
Labour Cost in US dollars per hour 16.6 6.42 2.79 32.18
Lending Rate local lending rate .073 .040 .018 .273
10,686 observations. a): 8,383 observations
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the data used for the basic sample, including
10,686 balance sheets of German outbound investments during the period from 1996 until
2003.
5 Empirical Results
According to the investigation approach presented in section 3, we carry out three different
sets of estimations. All analysis involves panel data regressions, which include company
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fixed effects to control for unobservable firm-specifics that may be correlated with explain-
ing variables. Additionally, year dummies are considered to control for unobservable time
effects. In order to control for reasonable heterogeneity between industries, dummies for
61 industries at the affiliate level are included.
Table 3: Taxation and Financial Structure Choice
Dependent Variable Share of Intrafirm Debt Share of Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
STR .207∗ .256∗ .291∗ -.449∗ -.428∗ -.450∗
(.057) (.060) (.064) (.058) (.057) (.064)
ln(Lending Rate) .047∗ .041∗ .037∗ -.004 -.007 -.005
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.008)
ln(Sales) -.021∗ .019∗ -.009∗ -.011∗
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
STR x DLCF -.230∗ .175∗
(.089) (.094)
DLCF .145∗ -.119∗
(.002) (.003)
R2 .033 .042 .059 .066 .064 .084
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at the 5% level. All
estimates include a full set of firm, industry and time dummies. 10,686 observations, 775 firms.
First, we focus on tax incentives to shift profits in the context of financing decisions. The
regressions are based on equation (13). The results presented in table 3 indicate that taxes
indeed determine capital structure choices of German multinationals. Specifications in
columns (1)-(3) indicate a significant positive effect of a higher local tax rate on the share
of internal debt. Furthermore, columns (4)-(6) show that the share of equity finance is
reduced by an increasing statutory tax rate at the affiliate location. As interest deductions
do not save taxes if affiliates carry forward any losses, affiliates which exhibit a loss carry
forward constitute a suitable control group. This group is indicated by the dummy variable
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DLCF, which takes on the value one if an affiliate exhibits a loss carry forward, while
otherwise zero. The existence of a loss carry forward has a positive basic effect on the use
of internal debt as well, and, of course, a negative effect on the level of equity. However,
the opposite coefficient of the interaction term between DLCF and the statutory tax rate
supports the theory that taxes do not matter if an affiliate has a loss carry forward and
cannot avoid additional taxes by additional interest deductions.
The local lending rate does not influence the share of equity used, and a higher local lending
rate effects more internal debt. The latter effect is in line with existing empirical findings9,
which clearly indicate that internal debt constitutes a substitute for external debt, when
local costs of external borrowing increase. The substitution proposition is also supported
by a negative effect of larger sales on internal debt share, as a larger sales size is associated
with higher cash flows and, thus, might improve the access to external capital.
With regard to the magnitude of estimated tax effects, the results suggest that affiliates
without loss carry forward have a 2.9 percentage point higher internal debt ratio and a 4.5
percentage point smaller equity ratio if the tax rate is increased by 10 percentage points.
To sum up, our estimates support the theory that tax planning via finance works effectively
in practice.
Second, the tax response of intrafirm sales is analysed. The specifications presented in
table 4 are based on equation (14). As the dependent variable the natural log of ‘ac-
counts receivable from affiliated companies’ is used. However, the explaining variable total
turnover may be simultaneously determined together with the dependent variable. For this
reason, all regressions are instrument variable (IV) estimations, where the natural log of
GDP is used as an instrument for the variable ln(Sales). Typically, GDP indicates the size
of the local market. Thus, the correlation between turnover and GDP is due to third-party
sales. Intrafirm deliveries should not be affected by the size of the local market in which
9See Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) as well as Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber and Wamser (2006) for
empirical evidence.
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Table 4: Taxation and Intrafirm Transfer Pricing
Dependent Variable ln(Accounts Receivable from Affiliates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STR -.365 -1.02 -1.23 -1.86∗
(.629) (.596) (.673) (.655)
ln(Sales) .481∗ .405∗ .521∗ .439∗
(.155) (.145) (.146) (.137)
ln(Lending Rate) -.720∗ -.640∗ -.683∗ -.612∗
(.118) (.102) (.114) (.099)
STR x DFIN 1.90∗ 2.07∗
(.816) (.814)
DFIN .455 .360
(.302) (.300)
STR x DLCF 3.13∗ 2.88∗
(.925) (.876)
DLCF -1.36∗ -1.22∗
(.323) (.303)
R2 .062 .129 .067 .133
All regressions are instrument variable (IV) estimations, where the natural log of GDP is used
as an instrument for ln(Sales). Second stage regression results are presented only. F-tests of the
significance of the first stage specifications are all significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at the 5% level. All estimates include a full set
of firm, industry and time dummies. 8,383 observations, 561 firms. Estimations are based on a
subsample consisting of all observations which exhibit positive accounts receivable from affiliated
companies.
the affiliate is located. Therefore, it is reasonable to use GDP as a suitable instrument for
‘sales’.
The specification in column (4) presented in table 4 indicates a significantly negative effect
of a higher local tax rate on ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies’. As accounts
receivable constitute a snapshot of annual total sales, the result is likely to support a
significantly negative impact of a higher tax rate on reported intrafirm sales. Similar to
the set of results presented for finance responses to taxation, specifications are presented
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in columns (2)-(4) of table 4, which are likely to separate the tax effect on intrafirm sales
more precisely. First, affiliates holding shares in other affiliated companies or giving loans
to them may have higher ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies’ at balance sheet
date, resulting from unpaid dividends or interest. Therefore, a dummy variable, DFIN,
which indicates that an affiliate has financial interests such as shareholding or giving credit
in other affiliated companies, is included in the regressions presented in columns (2) and
(4) of table 4. It is not surprising that the coefficients of the interaction between DFIN and
the tax rate indicate less tax response of ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies’
for these affiliates. Second, the dummy variable DLCF, which indicates the existence of
a loss carry forward, is also used. The empirical results provided by columns (3) and
(4) confirm that the existence of a loss carry forward effects an opposite tax impact on
reported ‘accounts receivable from affiliated companies’. This opposite effect is caused by
the incentive to shift profits to an affiliate, which can offset additional profits with former
losses. These results are in line with MacKie-Mason (1990), who finds significantly less
response to tax by means of financing for US firms that suffer losses.
With regard to control variables, higher total turnover is associated with higher accounts
receivable and a higher lending rate with smaller accounts receivable. The latter confirms
the proposition that local costs of refinancing impact the company’s internal payment
policy. Intrafirm accounts receivable should be paid faster than higher local refinancing
costs are.
According to equation (14), the coefficient of the tax rate must be interpreted as a semi-
elasticity. Considering for example column (4), a one percentage point higher local tax
rate is associated with 1.86 per cent smaller accounts receivable from affiliated companies
in cases of German controlled companies, which do not have any loss carry forward or
financial interest in affiliated companies. Furthermore, if a loss carry forward exists, a one
percentage point higher tax rate attracts around 1 per cent higher accounts receivable.
Although it is not possible to isolate a pricing effect from a quantity effect, we can clearly
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derive from the empirical results that profit shifting, due to intrafirm transfer pricing,
works effectively in practice.
Table 5: Taxation and Investment
Dependent Variable ln(Fixed Assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STR -1.10∗ -1.08∗ -1.43∗ -1.58∗
(.400) (.424) (.345) (.345)
PVD x STR .796∗ .793∗ 1.13∗ 1.16∗
(.381) (.380) (.296) (.300)
STR x DLCF -.067 .499
(.623) (.459)
DLCF .009 -.031
(.220) (.167)
ln(Sales) .759∗ .767∗
(.021) (.021)
ln(Lending Rate) .025 .025 .061 .057
(.050) (.050) (.038) (.039)
ln(GDP) .242∗ .243∗ .025 .016
(.027) (.026) (.020) (.020)
ln(Labour Cost) -.100 -.101 -.248∗ -.241∗
(.053) (.052) (.041) (.041)
ln(Distance) -.014 -.014 .048∗ .045∗
(.018) (.018) (.014) (.015)
ln(Corruption) .342∗ .343∗ .209∗ .202∗
(.094) (.095) (.075) (.075)
R2 .246 .246 .464 .466
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at the 5% level. All
estimates include a full set of firm, industry and time dummies. 10,686 observations, 775 firms.
Finally, real investment decisions are regarded and regressions are carried out according
to equation (15). The results presented in table 5 support the expected negative impact
on the size of investment in assets due to higher local tax rates. The specification also
confirms a positive effect of a higher present value of tax depreciation on investment. The
latter finding supports the proposition that tax planning is also focused on timing effects
of taxation besides considering tax rate differences.
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With regard to control variables, we will shortly summarise some issues. The size of
GDP, as an indicator for the market size, is associated with higher investment. Further-
more, higher labour costs are associated with less investment, and higher corruption effects
smaller investment. The effect of distance is ambiguous. The positive effect of a higher lo-
cal lending rate on investment size might be surprising. We know from results presented in
table 3 concerning capital structure choices that German multinationals have some advan-
tage against local firms, due to substitution opportunities of local debt by intrafirm debt.
This indicates that there is a positive effect of higher local lending rates on investment,
which may induce German multinationals to invest more in countries with less favourable
capital market conditions due to a financing advantage. Furthermore, the specifications in
columns (3) and (4) support the idea that the effect of the market size on investment is
more precisely controlled by including the local sales size instead of a GDP proxy.
To sum up, our empirical results support clearly the suggestion that multinationals engage
in profit shifting via debt financing and intra-firm sales. The theoretical analysis carried
out in section 2.2 indicates that IAS 12 income tax reporting provides clear-cut information
about international tax rate arbitrage, i.e. profit shifting. Thus, we conclude that insofar
IAS 12 discloses the relevant information concerning the tax burden of a multinational
company. However, we also find empirical evidence that multinationals engage in real
investment shifting and that investment decisions are driven by both tax rates and tax
depreciation rules. In section 2.1 we show that IAS 12 does not provide reliable information
concerning tax consequences of real investment shifting. Thus, given the observable tax
planning patterns of multinationals, we cannot rule out the possibility that IAS 12 income
tax reporting might be misleading.
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6 Conclusion
IAS 12 (Income taxes) is designed to provide information about both the company’s tax
burden and tax planning performance. A multinational company may engage in inter-
national profit shifting as well as international investment shifting. Theoretical analysis
indicates that IAS 12 does not provide reliable information about the tax consequences
of international investment shifting because information concerning the timing effects of
tax depreciation rules is suppressed. On the other hand, theoretical analysis shows that
IAS 12 reveals the tax consequences of international profit shifting, which is only driven
by differences in the country-specific statutory tax rates. Consequently, the information
content of income tax accounting according to IAS 12 depends on the relevance of the
respective type of tax planning in which the company engages.
Using firm-level data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find empirical evidence that
German multinationals engage in tax driven international profit shifting via debt financing
and intra-firm sales. However, we also find empirical evidence that tax induced investment
shifting is relevant in practice. Therefore, we conclude that IAS 12 income tax accounting
does not fully disclose the company’s tax burden and tax planning performance.
Accounting information concerning income taxes may be used as a performance measure
for a company’s tax management if the focus of tax management is clearly on international
profit shifting. When, however, the company’s tax planning strategy is unclear shareholders
should use accounting information provided by IAS 12 with caution, as both reported
income taxes and reported effective tax rates might be seriously misleading. Of course, IAS
12 could be amended in order to provide better information about the tax consequences of
international investment. However, it might be difficult to assess if better information due
to full disclosure of tax effects on reported profits justifies both the increasing complexity
and the additional costs of preparing financial statements.
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Datasources and Definitions
Firm-level data are taken from the MiDi-dataset of the Deutsche Bundesbank, see Lip-
poner (2006) for an overview.
Corporation tax data are taken from the IBFD databases and from tax surveys provided
by the tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG.
Distance is taken from “www.etn.nl/distance.htm”. It contains flight distance in km.
GDP in US dollars, nominal, taken from OECD Economic Outlook (2005) 77.
Labour Cost are hourly compensation costs in US dollars for production workers in
manufacturing. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, augmented by data provided by
Eurostat as “Hourly Labor Costs” on an annual basis.
Lending Rate is the lending rate for credits to the private sector, taken from the IMF
International Financial Yearbook (2005), augmented with corresponding ECB figures, that
are taken from “www.ecb.int/stats/pdf/money/interest/rir nrir.pdf”.
Corruption is an index published annually by Transparency International ranking coun-
tries in terms of perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert assessments and
opinion surveys. The scores used ranges from 10 (country perceived as virtually corruption
free), to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt).
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